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LOST IN TRANSLATION? DATA MINING,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE "ADVERSE
INFERENCE" PROBLEM
Anita Ramasastryt
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the childhood game of telephone: children sit in a circle
and one child whispers a secret in the ear of a child sitting next to
him. That "secret" is then relayed to the next child through a
whispered remark. Eventually, the secret is relayed through the entire
chain of children, as if multiple telephone calls had been placed, and a
message relayed to numerous parties. Very often, the message that is
relayed to the last child in the chain is very different from the original
secret conveyed. The message has gotten distorted and lost in
translation. Why? As data gets shared with a wider circle of people
and multiple human actors have been asked to interpret and relay a
message, as they understood it, to new people, the original message
gets lost in translation.'
Today, a giant game of telephone is going on with our personal
data. Our personal data, which we might disclose to a bank clerk over
a counter, or provide to a customer service representative over the
telephone, ends up far away from where it first started. Through a
process known as data aggregation, messages about who we are and
records containing our personal identifiers are being compiled from
many sources, and this aggregated data is being transferred to third
parties at a rapid speed. During this process of travel and
aggregation, a seemingly inconsequential disclosure of a phone
number to a store clerk can snowball into an "enhanced" file. Such
t Associate Professor and Co-Director, Shidler Center for Law, Commerce &
Technology, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to thank Chris
Hoofnagle of the Electronic Privacy Information Center for his comments on this article.
1. Erick Breck & Clare Cardie, Playing the Telephone Game: Determining the
Hierarchical Structure of Perspective and Speech Expressions, CORNELL UNIV. DEP'T OF
COMPUTER SCI. (2004),
http://www.cs.comell.edu/-ebreck/publications/docs/breck04playing.pdf.
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files are reformatted, edited, analyzed, interpreted, and changed to
include volumes of information about a household, personal interests,
and even medical conditions.
Often, we have little control over the messages that are being
conveyed because we are not privy to this process - it happens
behind the scenes. It is only recently that the American public has
begun to realize that they have little control over their personal
information once it is shared with a third party. And this has become
of even greater concern now that we know that the federal
government may be at the end of a "telephone" chain, reviewing
personal data in order to combat terrorism.
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has tried to
connect more "dots" (data points) to prevent terrorism - by piecing
together pieces of information and data to uncover possible plots and
patterns. As part of this effort, the Executive Branch has introduced
various proposals to "mine" private sector commercial databases and
public records (as well as public databases) for information on
everything from consumer addresses to financial and credit profiles.
Such information, when fed into computers and analyzed, is meant to
help the U.S. government predict who might be involved in terrorist
activity. 2
Data mining is a technique that uses information technology to
identify previously undisclosed patterns and connections between
different points of existing data, often with the goal of predicting
future behavior.3 In the world of commerce, this is done to maximize
profit and to improve consumer experience. In recent years, the
business of data collection has expanded with the rise of commercial
data brokers - companies that aggregate consumer data from a wide
variety of records, both public and private. Such data is then
combined to create robust and detailed profiles on consumers. Data
brokers may aggregate everything from cell phone records to travel
reservations.4 The government often purchases consumer data from
For a comprehensive overview, see JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CRS Report RL31798, DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW (2006),
http://www.fas.orgsgp/crs/intel/RL31798.pdf.
3. Id. at 1.
4. MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE ON NAT'L SEC. IN THE INFO. AGE, SECOND REPORT,
CREATING A TRUSTED INFORMATION NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 57-58 (2003),
http://www.markletaskforce.org/reports/TFNSReport2_Master.pdf [hereinafter MARKLE TASK
FORCE REPORT].
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such data brokers for varied purposes. 5  Law enforcement, for
example, might want to try and locate the addresses of persons with
outstanding arrest warrants.
Civil rights advocates have declared that governmental use of
private sector data is a serious infringement on the right to privacy.
One of the reasons for this declaration is that government now has
access to vast "digital dossiers" maintained by commercial data
brokers. 6 These private sector dossiers are available for purchase and
reveal a great deal about our habits, patterns and daily activities. If
combined with data from other sources, the government may be able
to peek into our personal lives without having to obtain search
warrants. Individual data points may not reveal much about our
personality, but when compiled and stored over a longer period of
time, our personal profiles become more revealing.
In essence, digital dossiers may enable the government to keep
track of all of us through centralized databases. Our movements can
be reconstructed by examining our credit card and debit card
purchases; traffic cameras may scan our license plate; even our cell
phone can help the government locate our travel path. Due to the
volume of data that the government can now access with just the click
of a button, data aggregation has changed the nature of the debate
about if, when, and how government should have access to private
sector data.
While civil libertarians may worry about erosions of individual
privacy, many Americans who are concerned about fighting terrorism
express the belief that if people are honest and law abiding, they have
nothing to fear from the government knowing more about them. This
can be referred to as the "I have nothing to hide" sentiment; the idea
there should be no reason to fear government surveillance if one is a
law-abiding person. 7
This paper examines the use of data mining by the federal
government to achieve national security goals and prevent terrorism,
5. See Robert Pear, Survey Finds US. Agencies Engaged in 'Data Mining', N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2004, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/27/national/27privacy.html?ex=1401076800.
6. Professor Daniel Solove first used the term "digital dossiers" in this context. Daniel
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV
1084 (2002).
7. For a useful article on American opinions on issues relating to privacy versus security,
see Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the
Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America, 48 AM. J. POL. Sci. 28 (2004), available at
http://www.msu.edu/-bsilver/AJPSCivLib.pdf.
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and in particular attempts to rebut this notion that governmental
analysis of commercial data and other personal data has little or no
adverse consequences to the American population. To the contrary,
governmental data mining can lead to the problem of "adverse
inferences." Specifically, where a person has committed no crime or
has nothing to fear, the use of data mining by the government can lead
to the drawing of erroneous and adverse inferences, including the
inference that this person poses a potential security risk. Adverse
inferences such as these could lead to citizens being wrongly denied
certain rights, such as the right to travel or the right to access
governmental services. 8 When data mining generates an incorrect
inference, it is referred to as a "false positive": "false" because the
person is not truly exhibiting behavior that the data mining system is
meant to uncover - such as terrorist activity, and "positive" because
the system has flagged that person as a possible risk, thus triggering
further scrutiny of that person or of their data.
Being identified as a security risk may mean public stigma and a
fear of loss of control over one's life. For example, if mistakenly
labeled a threat or possible danger to national security, how does one
clear her name or remove herself from a government watch list?
When a person is singled out based on unknown data retrieved from
an unknown database, there is no clear-cut answer to this question.
These fears become more palpable when one realizes that commercial
data varies greatly in quality, may contain numerous errors, and is not
subject to any mandated standards or control. The crucial issue with
respect to data mining by the federal government is not whether or not
we have anything to hide, but whether we can achieve national
security goals while safeguarding the population from adverse
inferences and their consequences.
The more data the government "mines," the larger the number of
possible adverse inferences that may be drawn or false positives
generated. In terms of a signal to noise ratio, proponents of data
mining need to demonstrate that the success of such mining efforts
will outweigh the frequency of false positives that will be generated.9
8. DANIEL J, WIETNZER, ET AL., MIT COMPUTER SCI. AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
LAB., TECHNICAL REPORT MIT-CSAIL-TR-2006-007, TRANSPARENT ACCOUNTABLE DATA
MINING: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION 4 (2006),
http://www.w3.org/2006/01/tami-privacy-strategies-aaai.pdf (discussing the fact that adverse
actions can sometimes be taken based on factually incorrect antecedents).
9. See, e.g., ASSOC. FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, U.S. PUB. POLICY COMMITTEE,
LETTER TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITEE (Jan. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/acm-letter.php. For an alternative view, which critiques some of
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While the adverse inference problem should not be a reason for
prohibiting governmental data mining, it should certainly cause
legislators and others to examine data mining proposals with
increased vigilance. While focusing on the problem of adverse (and
incorrect) inferences, one also needs to examine the level of
effectiveness of any data-mining project. The risk of "false
negatives" - missing crucial people or events - is another risk that
needs to be weighed when deciding what types of governmental
programs should be authorized.10
This paper is not a polemic against the use of data mining as a
means of preventing terrorism. Indeed, experts have lined up on both
sides of the debate over data mining for national security purposes." 1
Rather, it attempts to highlight the harm that may arise if there are not
proper safeguards built into project design and implementation. In
the long run, governmental use of databases to authenticate identity
may be beneficial, as it allows a greater degree of precision in
determining who a person is and whether persons with similar names
or characteristics are in fact different people.
The use of the term "lost in translation" as the title of this essay
is an apt one because as data migrates from the private sector -
where it was used for specific purposes' 2 - into the government's
the assumptions used by opponents of data mining, see David Jensen, Mathew Rattigan &
Hannah Blau, Information Awareness: A Prospective Technical Assessment (Assoc. for
Computing Machinery 2003), available at http://kdl.cs.umass.edu/papers/jensen-et-al-
kdd2003.pdf. The authors contend that current critiques of government data mining or
information awareness systems use a "simplistic model of data mining" which does not factor
in many of the techniques available to develop more sophisticated data analysis. Id. at 3. The
authors also note that using relational data, a ranking classifier and multi-passing reference as
part of a program design, a system can be configured to greatly reduce the number of false
positives. Id. at 6.
10. Terrance A. Maxwell, Information Policy, Data Mining, and National Security: False
Positives and Unidentified Negatives, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 38TH HAWAII INT'L
CONFERENCE ON SYS. SCIS. 7 (2005), available at
http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2005/2268/05/22680134c.pdf.
11. For a thoughtful article on federal initiatives relating to data mining and terrorism
prevention, and whether they should be allowed to proceed with appropriate safeguards, see K.
A. Tapiale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5
COLUM. ScI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2003). The Markle Task Force on National Security in the
Information Age recommends that the government should have increased access to data in order
to try and prevent terrorism, but also recommends revising current standards for governmental
access to private sector data. MARKLE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at I
(Recommendation 6).
12. See, e.g., David M. Lawson, Mining External Data Sources: Making Sure Nothing is
Lost in Translation, CONNECTIONS, Spring 2004, at 8, available at
2006]
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domain, the data is being used in new contexts and for purposes not
originally anticipated. The data collected by commercial data brokers
was not initially gathered with terrorism prevention in mind, and can
thus be misinterpreted by government entities when used in the new
context of terrorism risk assessment.
Subsidiary questions arise from the fact that once government
agencies have access to our digital dossiers, they may be tempted to
keep the data and use it for purposes other than that for which it was
initially obtained. This is sometimes referred to as "mission creep"
- where data collected in the name of national security will be used
by the government to do things like chase tax evaders, monitor
protected First Amendment activity, or build profiles on people to use
for the prosecution of other crimes. 13
While Congressional regulation and oversight is not always
appropriate, in the case of data mining, Congress needs to maintain a
healthy skepticism about the power of data mining as a tool in
terrorist prevention. Government can more effectively authenticate a
person by using more data points - and surely this is a laudable goal.
But there are risks inherent in the systems that have been proposed by
the government, and those risks need to be more openly examined and
debated. 14
To the extent that we permit data mining programs to proceed,
they must provide adequate due process and redress mechanisms that
permit individuals to clear their names. A crucial criteria for such a
mechanism is to allow access to information that was used to make
adverse assessments so that errors may be corrected. While some
information may have to be kept secret for national security purposes,
a degree of transparency is needed when individuals are trying to
http://www.aprahome.org/pdfs/Connections/LawsonMiningSpringO4.pdf (example of how data
needs to be carefully interpreted when being used in a new or different context from the one for
which it was originally collected).
13. SEIFERT, supra note 2, at 18-19.
14. See, e.g., Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy On The Data-Mining Reporting Act of
2003, http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200404/042204g.html (Apr. 22, 2004). Leahy notes:
We have a responsibility to remain vigilant in our scrutiny of these
programs. The Data-Mining Reporting Act simply provides us the necessary
oversight information to carry out this responsibility. It offers a dose of sunshine
to help Congress' oversight of the unprecedented mixture of these powerful new
technologies that have great potential to help make us more secure, but also to
make us less free.
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protect their right to travel or access government services free from
suspicion. 15
Part II of this essay briefly outlines the government's ability to
gain access to private sector data held by commercial entities or "third
parties." Part III of this essay examines data mining and some of the
problems inherent in using data analysis as a predictive tool for
terrorism prevention. Part IV of this paper focuses on the specific
problem of adverse inferences. This section examines the recent
efforts of the federal Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
use data mining in airline passenger profiling. The Computer
Assisted Passenger Profiling and Prescreening System II (CAPPS II)
as mapped out by the TSA, and the most recent initiative, Secure
Flight, illustrate some of the perceived risks inherent in the use of
data mining to try and predict whether individuals are a security risk.
Part V of this paper explores what efforts Congress and policynakers
can make to address the risk of false positives and adverse influences,
and the rise of commercial data mining as a favored tool for
combating terrorism.
II: GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO DATA HELD BY THIRD PARTIES
Before analyzing government efforts with respect to data mining,
one needs to first understand how and when the federal government
may obtain access to data held by third parties. Americans often
think of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as providing
blanket protection against unreasonable governmental "searches and
seizures" of their personal belongings and information, regardless of
whether such information is stored in their own homes or with a third
party. But, as Fourth Amendment scholars are quick to point out, the
need to obtain a search warrant before gaining access to our
possessions or our information is dependent upon whether we have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in a particular context. If no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the government is not
15. Certain government efforts, including passenger screening, have been challenged on
Constitutional grounds as violating a citizen's right to travel freely, as well as their right to due
process. These issues are not addressed in this article, which focuses more on the privacy
interests that should be protected, even when the federal government is obtaining data in a
manner that does not violate the U.S. Constitution. For a useful overview of recent
Constitutional challenges to transportation security regulations, see TODD TATELMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT RL32664, INTERSTATE TRAVEL: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO THE IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT AND OTHER TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
REGULATIONS (2004), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32664.pdf.
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required to obtain a warrant before effecting a search or seizure of our
belongings.
When we subscribe to a magazine, check out library books, or
apply for a credit card, we voluntarily relinquish some of our personal
data (including sensitive data, such as a Social Security Number) to a
third party. While to some extent we give up this data freely in order
to gain access to a desired service, like getting access to credit, this
notion of voluntariness is a bit false, as it is not possible to transact
and survive in modem society without giving up some information to
third parties on a daily basis. We could, for example, refuse to have a
telephone and never give up data to a telecommunications company.
A phone, however, is a vital lifeline for many; it provides access to
essential government services such as the police, hospitals and public
utilities. And for those who live in rural areas or who are
housebound, it would be hard to say that they can reasonably choose
not to maintain telephone service. 16
Does the government need to obtain a warrant supported by
"probable cause" before they are allowed access to the data held by
third parties such as telecommunication companies or other
businesses? 17 In other words, do members of the public have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when third parties retain sensitive
information about them? Two United States Supreme Court cases,
United States v. Miller1 8 and Smith v. Maryland,19 establish a general
rule that if information is in the hands of third parties, an individual
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to that
information. In such a case, the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement would not apply.20
16. Solove, supra note 6, at 1157. Solove notes that "entities that maintain systems of
records collect data in a power dynamic where information disclosure is often not consensual."
Solove mentions that employers and landlords have a substantial amount of power to gather
information. He contrasts employers and landlords with business actors, and notes that business
merchants have less coercive relationships with individuals than entities that govern our
livelihood and dwellings. At the same time, however, he acknowledges that "[e]ven if people
are informed, that have little choice but to hand over information to third parties. Life in the
Information Age depends upon sharing information with a host of third party entities including
phone companies, ISPs ... " Id. at 1158.
17. Id. See also Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically
Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 509-10 (2005).
18. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 45 (1976).
19. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 435 (1979).
20. DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 201 (NYU Press 2004). See Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and
Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of USA Patriot Act Section 215, 1 J.
NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 37, 42 (discussing U.S. v. Miller). As Woods notes:
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This concept that information held by third parties has, in
essence, already been disclosed to someone and is therefore no longer
private, is also referred to as the third party doctrine. However, there
may be some limits to this doctrine. For example, individuals must
relinquish sensitive data when seeking access to medical services;
they provide this information to a doctor or a hospital because it is
helpful for the health care provider to know about their medical
history when providing necessary and, at times, lifesaving treatment.
But to say that this is a voluntary bargained-for relinquishment would
be to stretch the notion of voluntariness.
Medical history might be one of a limited number of classes of
information held by third parties that retains its private nature when
retained by a third party. So what about individual profiles
maintained by a data broker, which may include a social security
number, names of relatives, or previous employers? As Professor
Daniel Solove has noted "[t]he government's harvesting of
information from these extensive dossiers being assembled with
modem computer technology poses one of the most significant threats
to the privacy of our times. '' 21 Thus, scholars such as Solove have
asked us to rethink our notions of the Fourth Amendment and when
government may have unfettered access to data held by third
parties. 22
In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that the government can use a
grand jury subpoena to obtain a defendant's financial records from a bank
without intruding into an area protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court
pointed out that "'no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment' is
implicated by governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion
into a zone of privacy, into 'the security a man relies upon when he places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area."' The checks,
deposit slips, and bank statements produced in response to the subpoena were not
the defendant's "private papers," the Court held; rather, they contained "only
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in
the ordinary course of business." By handing over this information to a third
party, the defendant took the risk that it would be conveyed to the government by
that third party.
See also Fred H. Cate, Legal Standards for Data Mining, at 7, in 21ST CENTURY ENABLING
TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICIES FOR COUNTER TERRORISM (Robert Popp & John Yee eds.,
IEEE/Wiley & Sons 2006), available at
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl-s47Details/FileUpload265/1250/CateFourthAmendment.pdf.
Cate discusses Smith v. Maryland, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that information about
telephone calls such as the number dialed and time and duration of the call were not protected
by the Fourth Amendment because such data was observable by third parties.
21. SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 202.
22. Solove, supra note 6, at 1151-56 (asking us to rethink nature of privacy architecture to
take into account relationships between parties). See also Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a
Search Under Justice Stevens's Fourth Amendment?, 74 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1735 (2006)
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Though data held by third parties is not constitutionally
protected, most Americans are still likely to assume that the
government cannot gain access to it. This may relate to notions of
privacy and the context in which we originally provide information.
For example, when we relinquish information to a credit card
company, we probably do not expect this data will be sold to
commercial data brokers. And Americans may not expect that
information handed over to a grocer will end up with the government
or a data broker.23 This relates more to our own beliefs and ways of
perceiving privacy and the flow of information. When a consumer
shops at Safeway, he does not think that the federal government might
someday be privy to whether he prefers Charmin toilet paper over a
generic brand. Of course, if the government knew what groceries he
bought, the consumer might not mind. But he would be more
concerned if the government knew of every store that he has ever
shopped at, or of every magazine that he has ever purchased.
That being said, Congress has stepped in to provide legislative
privacy protection to various types of personal data including health
and medical records, video rental records, and email messages. In
these instances, there are specific statutes that govern how law
enforcement may gain access to individual records. However, the
standards vary greatly.24 While at times the government needs a court
order, a showing of probable cause is not always required. The
Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the
Information Age has produced a useful table which lists the relevant
(noting that although Justice Stevens' jurisprudence supports the third party doctrine, other
opinions help "discern critical principles for limiting the reach of the third-party doctrine and its
application to data mining").
23. Helen Nissenbaum argues for a rethinking of privacy rules by focusing on contextual
integrity. She also notes that in the case of commercial data mining, there are situations where
merchants may breach rules of appropriateness and norms of information flow when selling
customer data to brokers and others. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 74
WASH. L. REv. 119, 152-53 (2004).
24. See, e.g., MARKLE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 58:
Government agencies already have access to certain kinds of privately held
information. However, the rules governing access to it have evolved haphazardly
and are confusing and sometimes contradictory. Moreover, the rules and
practices fail to take into account the dramatic evolution of information
technologies that can substantially increase the value of such data in haloing to
prevent acts of terror.
See also Cate, supra note 20, at 16 (mentioning sectoral statutes imposing "modest limits" on
the governments ability to seize data from third parties).
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statutes governing access to information in the private sector by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 25
There are standards for specific sectors of information, but there
is currently no legislation that regulates the ways in which the
government may access data maintained by data brokers. While the
government already has significant access to a variety of data sources,
the new debate over data mining focuses to a large extent on
commercial data brokers who have aggregated and warehoused
substantial digital dossiers on individual Americans.26 This paper
focuses mainly on this aspect of data mining.
III. DATA MINING: How DOES IT WORK AND WHAT ARE ITS
LIMITATIONS?
A. Background
Data mining refers to a process of using data analysis tools to
discover or infer previously unknown patterns and relationships from
large data sets. 27 Data analysis tools may include statistical models,
mathematical algorithms and machine learning methods, where
machines improve their performance over time as they are "taught" to
identify and distinguish correct patterns from incorrect patterns.
Thus, data mining involves various key steps, including data
collection, aggregation, processing and analysis. 28  This will
ultimately lead to decision making. With pattern-based data analysis,
25. See MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE ON NAT'L SEC. IN THE INFO. AGE, RULES
GOVERNING ACCESS TO PRIVATE SECTOR DATA,
http://www.markletaskforce.org/guidelines/govemment-matrix.shtm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
26. Chris Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect, Process and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595, 622-23 (2004) (arguing that the federal Privacy Act should
apply to commercial data brokers when they sell private sector data to the government).
27. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL
EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 1 (2004):
The term data mining" has a number of meanings. For purposes of this work, we
define data mining as the application of database technology and techniques -
such as statistical analysis and modeling - to uncover hidden patterns and subtle
relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future
results.
28. MARY DEROSA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD., DATA MINING AND DATA
ANALYSIS FOR COUNTERTERRORSM 9-13 (2004),
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040301 data mining_report.pdf, See also Taipale, supra
note 11, at 24-28.
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this may also lead to a prediction about whether certain data are
indicative of a possible future event occurring. 29
In the private sector, data mining has been used to detect fraud
and assess risk, as well as to discover future patterns of consumer
behavior. For instance, when Amazon.com recommends new books
to its customers, it does so by mining its customer database to try and
identify consumer preferences. 30  Banks and insurers use credit
scoring as a way to decide whether to grant us credit, and at what
rates or premiums. 31 Factors such as our credit score are meant to be
predictors of how likely we are to repay our loans; likewise, our
health, age and other physical charactereristics are meant to be
predictors of what our life expectancy may be. These are all different
applications of data mining.
B. Data Mining as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Recently, data mining has also been touted as a potential means
to identify terrorist attacks. This is not to say that law enforcement
has previously avoided data mining. The U.S Treasury Department
collects data from banks on certain types of financial transactions
pursuant to the federal Bank Secrecy Act, and these transactions are
then analyzed to try and find instances of money laundering. 32 Such
methods are also used to try and detect terrorist activity, including
29. DEROSA, supra note 28, at 12.
30. Charu C. Aggarwal & Philip S. Yu, Data Mining Techniques for Personalization,
BULLETIN OF THE IEEE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON DATA ENGINEERING, at 5-6 (2002),
available at http://cs.chungnam.ac.kr/-ykim/courses/grad-dbs2000/papers/DataMining.pdf.
31. Lyn C. Thomas, A Survey of Credit and Behavioral Scoring: Forecasting Financial
Risk of Lending to Consumers, 16 INTL' J. OF FORECASTING 149, 150-52 (2000), available at
http://socsci2.ucsd.edu/-aronatas/project/academic/A%20survey%/2of /o2Ocredit%20and%20be
havioural%20scoring%2OForecasting%20fina.pdf. See, e.g., BRENT KABLER, MO. DEP'T OF
INS., INSURANCE-BASED CREDIT SCORES: IMPACT ON MINORITY AND Low INCOME
POPULATIONS IN MISSOURI (2004), http://insurance.mo.gov/reports/credscore.pdf.
32. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the U.S. Department of Treasury states
on its mission page:
Technology such as data extraction, data mining and leading edge analytical tools
enhance the analysis and manipulation of BSA data-identifying and linking
related information to add value to what is already known by investigators,
enabling analysts to identify trends and patterns in money laundering and other
financial crimes, and linking BSA data with other information to identify
suspicious activity tied to organized crime groups.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Mission Page,
http://www.fincen.gov/fin-mission.html.
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terrorist finance flows. 3 3 What is new with respect to governmental
data mining is: (1) the announcement of specific anti-terrorism
initiatives focused on the general public, and (2) the plan to glean
large amounts of data from commercial data brokers as part of new
counter-terrorism initiatives. 34
Perhaps the most ambitious of federal data mining initiatives was
the poorly named "Total Information Awareness" (TIA) Program,35
which was renamed "Terrorism Information Awareness," perhaps in
response to public criticism of the original moniker.36 The program
was to be run by the Information Awareness Office, which at the time
was part of the federal Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). Retired Admiral John Poindexter, National Security
Adviser for former President Ronald Reagan, returned to the
Pentagon in February 2002 to run the Information Awareness Office
and TIA. 37
TIA envisioned the creation of a huge, centralized national
database of information, gathered from existing government and
commercial data banks. The records that were intended to be
compiled and consolidated included bank records, tax returns, driver's
license data, credit card purchases, airline tickets, gun purchases,
work permits, and more. 38 TIA was to then use computer algorithms
to detect suspicious patterns and try and identify possible terrorist
activity. However, in September 2003, Congress eliminated funding
for the controversial project and closed the Pentagon's Information
Awareness Office, which had created TIA.39
33. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT RL31798, TERRORIST
FINANCING: U.S. AGENCY EFFORTS AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION 38 (2005),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33020.pdf.
34. See Cate, supra note 20, at 2.
35. Anita Ramasastry, Why We Should Care About "Total Information Awareness" and
Other Anti-Terrorism Strategies for the Internet, FINDLAW, Dec. 31, 2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20021231 .html. The original logo for the TIA web site
was a pyramid with a giant eye beaming its rays onto the entire planet. This logo was eventually
removed from the site. TIA Logo, http://www.thememoryhole.org/policestate/iao-logo.htm (last
visited Apr. 26, 2006).
36. For a detailed description of "Terrorism Information Awareness" see REPORT TO
CONGRESS REGARDING THE TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM (May 20, 2003),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/may03_report.pdf. See also EEF REVIEW
OF MAY 20 REPORT IN TOTAL INFO AWARENESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20030523_tia-reportreview.php (last visited, Apr. 5, 2006).
37. Ramasastry, supra note 35.
38. Id.
39. CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2658, DEP'T OF DEF. APPROPRIATIONS ACT 2004,
H.R. REP. No. 108-283 (2004), http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2003/tia.html.
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The TIA concept is an example of a new and broad scale
experiment with governmental data mining of private sector
databases; an attempt to classify and predict terrorist populations
through an analysis of the general population. It is the depth and
breadth of such proposed initiatives that may have sparked
Congressional debates over data mining. TIA captured the public's
imagination, and eventually led to the program's demise.
C. Limitations of Data Mining For Terrorism Prevention
There are some inherent limits to data mining. Data mining can
help reveal patterns or relationships, but it may not tell a user the
significance of those patterns or relations; the user herself must
determine the significance or draw inferences. 40  Also, the
effectiveness of data analysis tools will be dependent upon the type of
criteria or assumptions that are built into any model or algorithm.
And, data mining can identify connections between variables, but it
cannot necessarily identify a causal relationship. 41
For example, a data-mining program might flag airline
passengers who purchased their tickets within a short time prior to the
flight's departure. Perhaps this has been determined to be a common
feature of terrorist or criminal travel. This, of course, does not mean
that everyone who buys an airplane ticket at short notice is a criminal
or terrorist. 42 The decision to place persons on a list based on the
nature of their ticket purchase is an adverse inference. The passenger
will have to subject himself to additional screening in order to prove
that he is not a security risk. People may purchase tickets on short
notice for multiple reasons. For example, a journalist has to travel on
short notice because of the nature of her profession. Other travelers
may need to travel on short notice due to an unexpected personal
event, such as a death or illness in the family. Thus, data mining can
identify behaviors, but not the underlying cause or motive for such a
behavior or pattern.
Successful data mining requires skilled experts who can analyze
the data and draw causal relationships and inferences from the
patterns identified by machines. The success of identifying behaviors
is dependent upon how relevant such patterns are to the underlying
behavior that a user is trying to find - such as terrorist activity. If
there are more non-terrorist than terrorist travelers who fly on short
40. SEIFERT, supra note 2, at 3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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notice, resources may be wasted in the investigation of "false
positives" - innocent persons identified as possible risks by a data
analysis program. The risk of these false positives is significant, if a
government actor chooses to proceed on the basis of data analysis
which includes possibly innocent persons.43
Patterns uncovered by data mining also need to be compared to
real world circumstances in order to confirm their validity. Law
enforcement agencies could use data analysis tools to identify persons
whose behaviors or actions matched profiles of known terrorists. The
question remains, however, of what to do when a person's behavior
deviates significantly? Critics of the use of data mining as a counter
terrorism measure have noted that once terrorists ascertain the types
of behaviors being sought out via data analysis, they can change their
patterns or activities to evade detection. Terrorists can ascertain what
sort of patterns trigger enhanced security screening, for example, by
sending testers on flights just to see if they are singled out. By testing
a system repeatedly, terrorists can determine what factors are
important and how someone can fly undetected. For example, if
persons who purchase one-way airplane tickets are seen as security
risks, a terrorist could buy a round trip ticket instead to evade
detection.44
43. DEROSA, supra note 28, at 15. As DeRosa notes:
But the stakes are so high when fighting catastrophic terrorism that there will be
great temptation for the government to use these [data mining] techniques as
more than an analytical tool. Government actors will want to take action based on
the results of data-analysis queries alone. This action could include detention,
arrest, or denial of a benefit. Even if the government later corrects its mistake, the
damage to reputation could already be done, with longer-term negative
consequences for the individual. Even when the error is identified, there may be
difficulties correcting it .... Although the technology exists to follow inaccurate
data and correct cascading occurrences, it has not been a priority, and its
implementation lags far behinds the technology for collecting and analyzing data.
44. See, e.g., Samidh Chakrabati & Aaron Strauss, Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for
Defeating the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System (May 16, 2002), available at
http://swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6805/student-papers/springO2-papers/caps.htm. (Paper prepared for
MIT Seminar on Law and Ethics on the Electronic Frontier). Two MIT students noted:
Any CAPS like airport security system that uses profiles to select passengers for
increased scrutiny is bound to be less secure than systems that randomly select
passengers through inspection. Using mathematical models and computer
simulation, we show how a terrorist cell can increase their chances of mounting a
successful attack under the CAPS system as opposed to a security system that
uses only random searches.
Id at 5. As the authors point out, the fact that one knows if one has been flagged as a security
risk is the
Achilles heel of CAPS: the fact that individuals know their CAPS status enables
the system to be reverse engineered.... You know if you've been questioned.
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1. Infrequent Events May Lead To Poorly Corroborated
Profiles
Security experts note that data mining works best when there is a
well-defined profile. An example of a more successful use of data
mining relates to the prevention of credit card fraud.45 The frequency
of credit card theft gives credit card companies many opportunities to
test their data analysis algorithms and programs, and to refine and
improve their fraud detection indicators.
Credit card issuers mine their transaction database and look for
suspicious transactions or unusual spending patterns that may indicate
that a card has been stolen and is being used for unauthorized
transactions. 46 Apparently, many credit card thieves exhibit a pattern
of purchasing expensive luxury goods and consumer goods that can
be easily fenced. 47 A credit card issuer can then either notify the
cardholder to try and verify the transaction, or in some cases shut
down the card. Cardholders typically do not mind these security
measures. Usually, a phone call to the cardholder resolves the
problem - either the card is indeed stolen or the cardholder can
verify the purchases as his or her own. 48 In some instances, the
cardholder may be traveling overseas and is unable to verify or deny
You know if you're asked to stand in a special line. You know if you've been
frisked. All of this open scrutiny makes it possible to learn an anti-profile to death
CAPS, even if the profile itself is always kept secret.
Terrorists can send operatives on flights, without any explosives or intention to
do harm. This will allow terrorists to test the system to see if they are detected or
searched, as a way of figuring out what anti-profile will be successful in evading
detection.
Id. at 8-9. See also ACM LETTER, supra note 9.
45. Schneier on Security, Data Mining for Terrorists,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/dataminingfor.html (Mar. 9, 2006). For an
overview of data mining techniques in credit card fraud detection, see PHILIP K. CHAN ET AL.,
DISTRIBUTED DATA MINING IN CREDIT CARD FRAUD DETECTION 14(6):67-74 (IEEE Intelligent
Systems 1999). See also DEROSA, supra note 28, at 4.
46. See, e.g., American Express Fraud Protection Guarantee,
https://wwwl 24.americanexpress.com/cards/cda/dynamic.jsp?name=FraudProtectionGuarantee_
SharedDetailsALL&type=intBenefitDetail (last visited Apr. 5, 2006), which states: "Our Fraud
Detection system watches your account for uncharacteristic or unusually high charges. If we
detect unusual activity on your Card, we may suspend further charges until we can confirm the
purchases were authorized."
47. Schneier, supra note 45.
48. Id. MasterCard is offering to notify cardholders using SMS (text messaging) to
cardholder cell phones. Laura Rohde, MasterCard Offers SMS to Detect Credit Card Fraud,
INFOWORLD, Feb. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/02/09/HNmastercardfraud 1 .html.
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the purchases, in which case his card may be blocked.49 In these few
cases, there may be mere annoyance when a cardholder finds himself
unexpectedly unable to complete a purchase, but he can often resolve
the issue and get the card unblocked. The few cases where this is not
possible leads to more annoyance to the customer, but the cost to
cardholders is marginal compared to the benefits of fraud detection,50
and ultimately, the possibility of corroborating the activity profile of a
credit card thief.
Terrorism prevention is a different matter, as security experts
point out. There is no well-defined and reinforced profile for
terrorists. Further, attacks are relatively infrequent, making it harder
to reinforce any profiles that do exist. Security expert and computer
scientist Bruce Schneier does a good job of explaining some of the
problems with data mining in the terrorism context. There are 900
million credit cards in circulation in the United States, and according
to an FTC study from September 2003, about one percent (one
million) of these cards are stolen and used for unauthorized purposes
each year. 51. While the total number of credit card transactions is
large, Visa and MasterCard are only analyzing one type of credit card
transaction - purchases and sales. This is a more limited class of
data to analyze, as contrasted with data mining for terrorism
prevention, which might involve many different types of data.
Furthermore, there are enough instances of confirmed credit card
fraud that data analysis techniques can constantly test any
assumptions against a large number of real world cases. This helps
the credit card industry to update its models and spot trends as they
emerge.
Terrorism prevention presents a much greater magnitude of data
than credit card transactions. As Schneier indicates, while there are
only a very few number of known terrorist plots at any given time,
there are "trillions of connections between people and events -
things that the data mining system will have to 'look at'- and very
few plots. This rarity makes even accurate identification systems
useless."' 52 The government will have to look at a much larger
amount of data in order to try and thwart a future terrorist event.
49. Carol Pucci, You could be out of the Country and out of Luck with your ATM Card,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18, 2006, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/travel/2002867484_puccil 9.html.
50. Schneier, supra note 45.
51. Id.
52. Id.
20061
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Schneier elaborates by explaining that even if one was to assume
the existence of a very "accurate " data mining system with only a 1
in 100 false positive rate (99% accurate) and a 1 in 1,000 false
negative rate (99.9% accurate), there would be one trillion indicators
to sift through daily. This amounts to about ten events - emails,
phone calls, purchases, etc. - per person in the U.S. per day. Of
these one trillion events, perhaps ten in any one day are actual events
connected to a terrorist plot. This "unrealistically" accurate system
would still generate one billion false alarms for each terrorist plot it
uncovers. The police may have to investigate 27 million potential
plots every day of every year in order to find one real plot per
month. 53 A recent example of a real data mining system generating
false alarms involves the National Security Agency's (NSA)
eavesdropping programs. According to a New York Times article,
NSA computers generated thousand of tips in the months following
9/11.54 Every one turned out to be a false alarm.
With government investigations, the cost of false positives is
clearly high, both in terms of government resources and invasion of
personal privacy. Of course, Schneier's example is assuming a data-
mining program more akin to TIA, rather than a more limited type of
data analysis, such as the examination of financial flows to try and
detect terrorist financing. If one limits the data analyzed, for example
to a certain region and to certain types of transactions, the risk of
errors is likely to decrease.
2. Erroneous and Inaccurate Records Impair the
Reliability of Third Party Data
As just demonstrated, one significant concern about the
governmental use of commercial data relates to the possibility of
error.55 One factor in error rates is data quality, which refers to the
accuracy and completeness of data used to draw inferences.
Duplicate records, the inconsistent or complete lack of data standards,
the timeliness of updates, and human error (e.g. incorrect data entry)
can all impact how effective data analysis will be. Even something as
slight as different date formats can cause records to be inconsistent
with one another. Data needs to be reliable and kept up to date if it is
53. Id.
54. Lowell Bergman, Eric Lichtblau, Scott Shane & Don Van Natta, Jr., Domestic
Surveillance: The Program; Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 led FBI to Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2006, at Al.
55. SEIFERT, supra note 2, at 17.
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to be used on a frequent basis for identity verification. 561n many data
mining or processing initiatives, data is "cleaned" to correct errors
before it is used and analyzed. 57
At present, data integration methods vary and may be based
solely on name and address, with additional information such as
social security numbers, date of birth, or driver's license data added in
when available. A report prepared by the Markle Foundation's Task
Force on National Security in the Information Age notes that name
and address data is currently captured in multiple formats, allowing
for the introduction of errors. Also, the information is often out of
date. According to Markle, twenty percent of the U.S. population
moves every year; five percent have second homes. Five million
marriages and two million divorces occur each year, resulting in name
and address changes. 58
Commercial data brokers do have techniques to resolve these
issues and to correct some errors, such as recognizing whether
someone listed as "Robert" in one record and "Bob" in another are in
fact the same person. These techniques, at present, have reduced error
rates by one to two percent, 59 which can still be significant when it
comes to the governmental use of such data.
However, errors do frequently exist in consumer credit reports. 60
This is important to remember, because many of the existing
government data mining proposals relate to the use of credit profiles
or consumer profiles retained by data brokers. A 2004 survey of the
U.S Public Interest Research group revealed some startling statistics.
Approximately one in four credit reports contain errors serious
56. As the Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age noted: "False
or incomplete data will accentuate the problem of both false positives and false negatives. There
are even broader implications if the government can access this faulty data and attach
consequences to it (for example, restricting the right of an individual to board an airplane."
MARKLE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 58. See also REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT
WORKING GROUP, PRESENTED TO THE TSA 10 (Sept. 19, 2005) (discussing problems with false
positives and negatives in identity matching) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT
WORKING GROUP].
57. DEROSA, supra note 28, at 10 (describing high quality practices for cleansing and
standardizing identity data including name standardization and address hygiene).
58. MARKLE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 60.
59. Id.
60. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, MISTAKES Do HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS (2004). See also CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA AND
NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING ASSOCIATION, CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONSUMERS 37-40 (2002) (cataloging nature of errors on consumer credit reports and
consequences of inaccuracies in terms of cost of credit),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/121702CFANCRACreditScoreReportFinal.pdf.
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enough to result in a denial of credit, employment, or housing. Fifty-
four percent of the reports analyzed contained personal demographic
information that was misspelled, long outdated, belonged to a
stranger, or was otherwise incorrect.61 This is a pertinent figure when
one realizes that governmental data mining is often premised upon the
use of such data when verifying a person's identity.
In well-managed data mining projects, an original data-collecting
organization is likely to be aware of the data's limitations and will
account for those limitations or errors accordingly, either by manually
correcting the errors, using data analysis that can correct the errors, or
by simply analyzing the data with these errors in mind. But when
data is used in another context or by another entity, such safeguards
may not exist.
Moreover, data may be interpreted out of context when reviewed
by a new user. For example, data collected from a shopper's club
card may be reflective not of a single purchaser, but of a household or
multiple groups of purchasers. A person may use a spouse's shopper
card when buying groceries for the family. The data is useful to the
grocery store because it shows patterns of household consumption.
However, that same data, if used to confirm identity, may produce
inaccurate results for a number of reasons. Shoppers may use
multiple cards, provide false names when they do obtain cards, or
swap cards within households or living units. Cashiers even swipe
their own cards or a "store card" when a shopper does not have one at
his disposal.
For marketing purposes these inaccuracies are negligible. If a
wife uses a husband's card, and he typically buys shaving supplies,
she might receive a coupon for razors when she next uses his
shopping card. While the grocery store's database made an incorrect
inference about who she is, the only consequence to her is that she got
a coupon that she might discard.
If, however, a government agency were to target individuals
based on the purchase of foods associated with religious observances
- Halal meat, for example - the consequences of inaccurate
identification change significantly. Similarly, if shopper card data
were used to infer where someone shopped on a particular day, the
risk of false positives increases. Re-use of data or data mining with
repurposed data thus presents larger problems with respect to data
61. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 60, at 4.
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quality and the drawing of incorrect inferences from data compiled by
other sources.
Another problem with data integrity relates to identity theft. 62
To the extent that the government wishes to use data from
commercial brokers, federal agencies may be relying on credit
histories and data that are created by thieves or imposters who have
assumed another person's identity. Thus, data mismatches may occur
because the victim of identity theft is unaware that a thief has, in
essence, rewritten the victim's personal history. This makes the data
less reliable.
The context in which individuals provide information to third
parties may also compromise data integrity. We may have more
incentive to be truthful when disclosing information to a government
agency, but to the extent that a consumer provides information in
various contexts in the private sector, he may have reasons for being
more or less candid about something - depending on who is asking
for the information and for what purpose. 63 For instance, one might
lie or provide only partial information when applying for credit, or
even making a purchase. Embarrassment might make a person
provide false data when purchasing pornography. When asked about
income, people may overstate or understate their earnings for a
variety of reasons. There are also problems of interpretation; persons
do not expect that information handed over in one context will wind
up being examined in a different one.
Another problem is that discrimination may result from the use
of commercial databases - disadvantage may be misinterpreted by
the TSA as shiftiness. On average, minority populations tend to have
lower credit scores, and certain categories of persons may have no
credit record at all.64  Certain populations, such as low-income
62. REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, supra note 56, at 12.
63. See, e.g., Web Lies and Privacy Studies, SAN JOSE BUS. J., May 30, 2002,
http://sanjose.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2002/05/27/daily46.html; Ann Bednarz, IBM
Unveils Web Privacy Work, NETWORK WORLD, May 31, 2002,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2002/053Iibmprivacy.html; Amy Bruckman, Gender
Swapping on the Internet, PROC. OF THE INTERNET SOC'Y (1993),
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bruckman93gender.html (discussing pattern of women identifying
themselves as male online to access information more freely); See generally Nissenbaum, supra
note 23; See also Solove, supra note 6, at 49.
64. See, e.g., Kabler, supra note 31, at 1-2 (concluding that insurance credit scoring was
lower for residents in low income and high minority populated zip codes; minority and low-
income individuals were significantly likely to have worse credit scores than wealthy
individuals and non-minorities). The report noted that "the relationship between minority
concentration in a zip code and credit scores remained after eliminating a broad array of
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individuals, students, immigrants and homeless persons, may also
move more frequently than others, so their data may be missing,
inaccurate, or contain suspicious gaps. There is also a fear that a
person may be excluded from certain types of commercial
transactions because of associations made or inferences drawn based
on limited classes of data such as a zip code. 65 Thus, the absence of
data could lead to businesses and government entities making adverse
inferences that a person is suspicious or has something to hide.
These are all examples of how data can get "lost" in translation.
First, data may not be accurate when provided initially by a consumer
or may only reflect a partial truth. Second, data may get mistranslated
due to human error (e.g. typing in a birth date incorrectly) when
placed into a database. Third, when data is used in a new context, it
may not be interpreted in the same way as previously used, because
the new party using the data may not understand how the data was
originally classified. For example, racial or ethnic classifications in
one database may be different than in a new database. Fourth, when
data from different sources is combined into a larger database, it may
be incorrectly integrated. In other words, data from different people
who share the same surname might be incorrectly merged, creating a
new profile that is incorrect. Thus, there are multiple ways in which
data may be erroneous. Where human agents are involved in
compiling or aggregating different data, data sources can be
mistranslated. 66
socioeconomic variables, such as income, educational attainment, marital status and
unemployment rates as possible causes. Indeed, minority concentration provided to be the
single most reliable predictor of credit scores." Id. at 2. While there may be specific reasons why
certain populations might have lower credit scores, there is a fear that location or address might
be used to correlate risk or lack of creditworthiness.
65. See, e.g., Claire Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co, 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(White plaintiff brought suit alleging that she had been denied a credit card solely because her
zip code placed her in a neighborhood with a high proportion of African Americans. Court held
that plaintiffs proof failed to show that the zip code ratings used by the creditor tended to
adversely affect black applicants disproportionately. Rather, it showed only that the 38-criteria
computerized grading system scheme, taken as a whole, tended to reject a disproportionate
number of persons living in predominately black areas).
66. Data, when combined from different sources, can create new records that are
inaccurate. The author's husband, for example, happens to share the same name with another
person who lives in our neighborhood. The neighbor has filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Data
brokers and merchants have combined a list of persons who have filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy, which includes the neighbor, with a list of property records (which includes the
author's husband's name) to create a list of property owners who have filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy. Alas, my husband receives mailings and calls from collection agencies, real estate
agents and others, who are either chasing the like-named neighbor, or trying to sell him products
and services aimed at individuals with financial troubles. The new record, which merges data
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IV. AIRLINE PASSENGER PROFILING: AN EXAMPLE OF THE ADVERSE
INFLUENCE PROBLEM
The recent efforts of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and TSA with respect to airline passenger profiling provide a
useful illustration of how data mining can create erroneous or adverse
inferences that have significant consequences for the American
population. These same illustrations also highlight the need for
clearer policies on (1) what information may be collected by the
government, (2) what processes will be in place for error correction,
and (3) how erroneously targeted citizens may clear their name
The program currently in existence provides a palpable example
of the problems innocent travelers may encounter when errors arise
due to data mining. The current passenger screening system, which
tries to locate passengers who are on a "no-fly" list, has made the
process of boarding a plane a burden for numerous Americans, in
come cases causing persons to lose the right to travel altogether.
Two proposed systems have attempted to use commercial data as
part of a process to better identify possible terrorist threats. Both the
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) and
Secure Flight have been criticized by Congress and the General
Accounting Office (GAO) for not being able to more fully safeguard
against errors in commercial databases and in the data analysis
process. They were also criticized for having vague or ambiguous
redress procedures. The two proposed programs highlight problems
that may exist with data mining, as well as the problem of
categorizing persons as potential security risks based on commercial
data.
A. The "No-Fly" and "Selectee" Lists
The administration of the "no-fly" and "selectee" lists, currently
maintained by the TSA in cooperation with the DHS, provide an
example of the harm caused by adverse inferences. 67 The no-fly list
was originally created in 1990 for the FBI (and was later maintained
by the Federal Aviation Administration), and lists individuals who
on two men, but which links the data to our home address, is erroneous and is used to draw
adverse inferences about my husband's financial situation.
67. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (EPIC), DOCUMENTS SHOW ERRORS IN TSA's "No FLY"
AND "SELECTED" WATCH LISTS,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtraveVfoia/watchlist-foia-analysis.html
[hereinafter EPIC WATCH LIST].
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have been "determined to pose a direct threat to U.S. civil aviation. '68
The selectee list is an outgrowth of a system known as Computer
Assisted Passenger Profiling, which commenced in 1996. While the
"no fly" and "selectee" lists do not involve commercial data mining,
the screening for these lists reveals the inherent problems in trying to
match data from different sources to identify which persons are
security risks.
Those who find their name on the lists suffer a variety of
consequences: they are typically denied the use of curbside check-in
and electronic ticket kiosks, are sometimes subjected to questioning in
full view of fellow passengers, and are often delayed for hours before
being placed on a different flight.69 In many cases, a TSA or airline
agent takes the passenger's identification and travel documents,
further adding to the feeling that the passenger is not free to leave the
airport. 70
Despite all these penalties, those on the lists are not given the
right to know why they were listed, or an avenue to try to clear their
name. According to some estimates, the no-fly and selectee lists
alone may affect thousands of innocent people. 71  Moreover,
according to a recently issued GAO report, the no-fly and selectee
lists are just two of 12 terrorist and criminal watch lists maintained by
the federal government.
In November 2001, the TSA assumed full responsibility for the
No-Fly and Selectee lists, and the Transportation Security Intelligence
Service (TSIS) currently serves as the clearinghouse for the addition
of names to the lists. The lists are distributed to all airlines, with
instructions to stop or conduct extra searches of people on the lists
who are suspected of being terror threats. The lists also appear to
have been shared widely among U.S. law enforcement agencies,
international agencies, and the U.S. military.
68. Id.
69. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Frequently Asked Questions About the "No Fly List" (Oct.
26, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/21164res20051026.html; See also Preliminary
Statement, Class Action Complaint in Green v. TSA, 6-9 (Wash. Dist. Ct. 2004), available at
http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/greenvtsa4O6O4cmp.pdf.
70. Preliminary Statement, Class Action Complaint in Green v. TSA, supra note 69, at 6;
See also Anita Ramasastry, A New ACLU Lawsuit Challenges "No Fly" and "Selectee List"
Procedures. Do these Government Watch Lists Violate Due Process?, FINDLAW, Apr. 13, 2004,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040413.html.
71. Preliminary Statement, Class Action Complaint in Green v. TSA, supra note 69, at 1.
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1. Getting on the Lists: Selection Criteria Unclear
How do the lists work? In October 2002, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) submitted a Freedom of Information Act
request to answer that very question, but the TSA failed to respond.
Initially, the TSA had denied that the lists even existed, but went on
to acknowledge their existence only weeks later. 72 In December
2002, EPIC filed suit to compel disclosure of the information being
sought - including TSA's criteria for putting people on the lists. 73
The suit also included complaints from passengers who felt that they
had been mistakenly placed on these lists. EPIC finally received the
documents it had requested, but found that they only revealed limited
details on how the lists are administered.
The documents did indicate that those on the no-fly list are not
allowed to fly, while those on the selectee list must go through
additional security measures, and that both lists are stored on air
carriers' computer systems. When a customer requests a boarding
pass, his or her name is compared to the two lists. If the name is on
the no-fly list, the airline must call a law enforcement officer to detain
and interview the passenger. If a name is on the selectee list, an "S"
or special mark is printed on the passenger's boarding pass and the
person is subjected to enhanced screening at security. 74
According to the Oakland Airport, the government's no-fly list is
eighty-eight pages long.7 5 The documents received by EPIC provide
scant information on how one gets placed on the list, for the
government insists on keeping this procedure secret.7 6  This, of
course, may be legitimate for security reasons. But in the event
criteria may not be revealed, the TSA needs to articulate enough
measures that a person may take to get removed from the list. In
other words, how can one effectively prove she is not a security risk?
There is no indication in the disclosed government documents of any
review by an independent third party to verify the lists' accuracy.
Nor is there reference in the documents to any formal procedure by
72. EPIC WATCH LIST, supra note 67.
73. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, EPIC v. TSA and Dept. of Transportion (D.C. Cir.
2002), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/tsa-foia-suit.pdf.
74. EPIC WATCH LIST, supra note 67.
75. JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH, ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, THE PUBLIC STILL LACKS
BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE NO-FLY LIST: AN ANALYSIS OF TSA'S FOIA. RESPONSE 2
(2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/072103-noflysummary.pdf.
76. Id.
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which individuals might clear their names - other than calling their
local FBI office. 77
Documents received in an April 2003 ACLU lawsuit, triggered
by the December 2002 detention of two female anti-war protesters
attempting to fly from San Francisco to Boston, are no more
encouraging. They reveal a confused process in which the
government expressed uncertainty about how the lists should be
shared. And once again, the documents failed to answer basic
questions about how the lists are generated and administered. 78
2. Getting off the Lists: A Bureaucratic Maze
As indicated by the complaint letters received by EPIC,
passengers who try to get off the lists face a bureaucratic maze. This
process, moreover, increasingly affects a larger number of innocent
Americans. According to ACLU reports, between September 11,
2001, and April 2003, at least 339 innocent air passengers were
stopped and questioned by police at the San Francisco Airport,
because their names were believed to match names on the No-
Fly/Selectee lists. 79 Indeed, the TSA has also admitted that it receives
thirty calls per day regarding false positives - which amounts to well
over a thousand calls a year. 80 This, of course, does not factor in
passengers who may have been flagged but who have not reported
their difficulties.
Currently, the TSA has an ombudsman for handling passenger
complaints, but not everyone is made aware of that fact. 81 According
to a second ACLU lawsuit, some passengers were told instead to
77. EPIC WATCH LIST, supra note 67.
78. Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Seeks Government Accountability For No-Fly List,
Rebecca Gordon et al. v. FBI et al. (feature on ACLU's No-Fly List FOIA Lawsuit and links to
litigation documents), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/l7463res20030606.html.
79. SRIKANTIATH, supra note 75.
80. Id. See also ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (EPIC), FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
NOTES, COMPLAINT LOG, http://www.epic.org/foia-notes/complaint log.pdf.
81. Preliminary Statement, Class Action Complaint in Green v. TSA, supra note 69, at
30-34. The plaintiffs in the Green case included persons who allege that their names were
wrongly included on the No-Fly list. Plaintiffs include a member of the military, a retired
Presbyterian minister, and a college student A federal court dismissed the lawsuit in January
2005, citing a lesser-known jurisdictional statute. In December 2004, Congress enacted a new
statute that requires TSA to enact new rules for the No Fly List. Rather than pursue an appeal
based on allegations that predate the new rules, the ACLU stated it would wait and see how the
new rules were implemented. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Background of Green v. TSA,
http://www.aclu-
wa.org/inthecourts/detail.cfm?id=319&CFID=4638238&CFTOKEN=85637108 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2006).
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contact the airlines or the FBI to be removed from the lists. Those
who do write to the ombudsman are not assured of getting a response;
the TSA states that the ombudsman will respond "only if
circumstances warrant it."'82 Furthermore, those who do get a reply
are asked to complete and return a Passenger Identity Verification
Form (PIVF) as well as submit copies of various identification
documents. Compliance with these requests will not necessarily
generate a response, and those who do receive a response may only
get a letter from the TSA that can be shown to the airlines in an effort
to clarify the mistake. In some cases, this letter does no good -
would-be passengers are still subject to search and scrutiny.83
In December 2004, Congress enacted legislation aimed at
providing due process mechanisms for those wrongly placed on the
No-Fly list. The law requires the TSA to create a system for travelers
to correct the inaccurate information that caused their placement on
the no-fly list. DHS was also required to create a Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board to review various government actions that
may have civil liberties implications for individuals. 84 In response,
the TSA has now published "Watch List Clearance Procedures."
Here, the TSA explains:
The TSA clearance process will not remove a name from the
Watch Lists. Instead this process distinguishes passengers from
persons who are in fact on the Watch Lists by placing their names
and identifying information in a cleared portion of the Lists.
Airline personnel can then more quickly determine when
implementing TSA-required identity, verification procedures that
these passengers are not the person of interest whose name is
actually on the Watch Lists.
The TSA web site goes on to state:
Clearance by TSA may not eliminate the need to go to the ticket
counter in order to check-in. While TSA cannot ensure that this
procedure will relieve all delays, we hope it will facilitate a more
efficient check-in process for you. Additionally, TSA has issued
guidance to the airlines to clarify further the Watch List clearance
protocol. 85
82. Class Action Complaint in Green v. TSA, supra note 69, at 30-34.
83. Id.
84. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Law Lets Passengers Appeal No Fly List, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
2004, at A2 1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8986-2004Decl 7.html.
85. TSA, Watch List Clearance Procedures,
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B. CAPPS II
The Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System II
(CAPPS II) has been one of the most controversial initiatives to
propose the use of commercial data mining for the assessment of
terror risk. With CAPPS II, there was a concern that data quality and
integrity might be compromised by integrating commercial data from
different sources - with different meanings for different sets of
data.86 The reason for the controversy may relate to the concept that
the TSA would peek into private sector records in order to "code"
people as different risk levels. CAPPS II was an attempt to use data
mining of commercial and government data not just to verify identity,
but to actually try and predict whether someone will be a security risk
based on commercial data. 87
The TSA was the agency tasked with implementing CAPPS II,
which was an outgrowth of an earlier system known as the Computer
Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) system, commenced in 1996
by Northwest Airlines. 88 As other airlines worked to implement
CAPS, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
(established by Executive Order following the crash of TWA Flight
800 in July of 1996, and sometimes referred to as the Gore
Commission) recommended in its final report to President Clinton
that the United States implement automated passenger profiling for its
airports.89 CAPS identified certain passengers as posing a security
risk based on assumptions of how terrorists travel. Passengers were
flagged for additional screening if they did things like purchase a one-
way ticket or pay for a ticket with cash. CAPPS II was portrayed by
http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme= 157&content09000519800fb8af (last visited Apr. 6,
2006); See also TSA, How the Process Works,
http://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/editorial_1829.xml (for further explanation by the
TSA of how the clearance process works) (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
86. Valerie Alberto & Dominique Bogatz, Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System ("CAPPS II"): National Security v. Civil Liberties 4 (May 19, 2004),
http://insct.syr.edu/Information%2OSharing%2OConf/AlbertoBogatz.pdf (Unpublished
background paper prepared for Conference on Information Sharing and Homeland Security
Program at the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University).
87. At least one commentator notes that CAPPS 1I is not data mining but rather "involves
data matching against a watch list or data aggregation to confirm identity." Taipale, supra note
11, at 38.
88. SEIFERT, supra note 2, at 7-8. The program was piloted by Northwest Airlines and
then was implemented by all of the airlines in 1998. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT
No. GAO-04-385, AVIATION SECURITY COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING
SYSTEM FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTEATION CHALLENGES 5 (2004) [hereinafter GAO,
AVIATION SECURITY].
89. SEIFERT, supra note 2, at 8.
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the TSA as an "enhanced system to confirm the identities of
passengers and to identify foreign terrorists or persons with terrorist
connections before they can board a U.S. aircraft." It was unveiled on
August 1, 2003.
1. The CAPPS II Design
CAPPS II was designed to send the information provided by a
passenger in the passenger's name record (referred to as a PNR, this
included the passenger's name, full address, phone number and date
of birth) to a commercial data provider so as to authenticate the
identity of the passenger. 90 The commercial data broker would then
send a numerical score back to the TSA to indicate the passenger's
perceived risk level. Passengers with a "green" score would undergo
normal screening, while passengers with a "yellow" score would be
subject to enhanced screening. Passengers with a "red" score would
not be allowed to board the flight, and would be interviewed or put in
contact with law enforcement. The scoring and "coding" of
passengers would be based on the percentage match between the
commercial data and the data held by the TSA.
According to an August 2003 notice in the Federal Register,
CAPPS II was meant to proceed through four steps: 91
(1) Data Collection. Airlines were required to collect
certain data from every passenger, and to pass it along
to the TSA. Upon purchasing an airplane ticket,
passengers were to provide four pieces of information:
their name, address, telephone number, and date of
birth.
(2) Identity Authentication. The TSA would send that
airline information to commercial data services, which
would then send back an "authentication score"
intended to indicate "a confidence level in that
passenger's identity."
(3) Risk Assessment. The TSA would then perform a risk
assessment for each passenger, drawing upon law
enforcement, intelligence, or other government
databases. Each person would be scored as either an
"acceptable,' .u".unknown," or "unacceptable" risk.
90. Id. at 8-9.
91. GAO, AVIATION SECURITY, supra note 88, at 6-7.
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(4) Enforcement of "Unacceptable" and "Unknown" Risk
Assessments. Each passenger's risk score would then be
forwarded to airport security personnel. Those who
scored as an "unknown" risk would be subjected to
heightened scrutiny. Those who received an
"unacceptable" risk assessment would be denied
boarding passes, and interviewed by law enforcement
authorities to determine if they could board the flight.
CAPPS II was initially intended to detect terrorists and keep
them off airplanes. In August 2003, however, TSA announced that it
would also serve as a law enforcement tool to identify individuals
wanted for violent crimes.92 TSA had hoped to test the system at
selected airports during the spring of 2004.
2. Shortcomings of CAPPS II
The CAPPS II screening procedure raised questions with respect
to the accuracy of data mining and its reliability as a predictor of
terrorist risk. What if a person's information was incorrect, or his
name was similar to that of a known terrorist or criminal? What if
someone else had assumed the passenger's identity? What are
tolerable false positive and false negative rates when it comes to
verifying identity, and how can mistakes be corrected? Or, what if a
person, due to her age or lack of income or credit history, was not
present in the databases, and so could not have her identity verified?
It was unclear, for example, whether someone having a cell phone
rather then a home phone number would be permitted to fly.93 The
TSA CAPPS II notice did not make clear the criteria for such
assessments, and much of the data relied upon would have been
confidential data, so that a passenger may never have known why he
or she had been deemed an "unacceptable" risk.
92. Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 45266 (Aug. 1, 2003)
(outlining the CAPPS II System).
93. EFF Comments on CAPPS II, Letter to Privacy Office of the Department of
Homeland Security, RE: Docket No. DHS/TSA-2003-1,
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/cappsii/20030930_comments.php.
Privacy advocates were concerned about the possible number of false positives should CAPPS II
be fully implemented. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has pointed out that even a
tiny error rate in the identification of suspected terrorists would create huge problems. With
CAPPS II checking an estimated billion transactions, the ACLU points out, "[elven if we
assume an unrealistic accuracy rate of 99.9%, mistakes will be made on approximately one
million transactions, and 100,000 separate individuals." (emphasis added). AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, THE FIVE PROBLEMS WITH CAPPS 11 (2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/16769leg20030825.html.
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Based on privacy concerns, Congress voted to block funding for
CAPPS II unless the TSA could satisfy eight criteria relating to
privacy, security, accuracy and oversight. In addition, Congress
asked the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a review
of CAPPS II to determine whether it met the relevant criteria.94
In February 2004, the GAO published its report on CAPPS II
and concluded that CAPPS II had numerous problems.95 The GAO
report found that as of January 2004, the TSA had not adequately
addressed seven of Congress' eight concerns. Why did the TSA fail
so spectacularly? In part, the GAO noted, because it failed to timely
test the CAPSS II program; according to the report, the TSA had not
effectively managed and monitored CAPPS II's development and
operation. 96 In addition, the TSA had also failed to protect passenger
privacy; address the accuracy of the data relied upon; create a system
to address erroneous labeling of passengers; prevent abuse; or create
security procedures. 97 Such procedures are necessary to prevent
hackers from compromising the data used in the screening process.
Further, TSA has also failed to adequately "stress test" CAPPS II
to see if it even worked.98 Did it really spot "high risk" passengers?
Did it waste resources with false high-risk assessments? Based on the
GAO findings, the answer was inconclusive. The report contains
some troubling conclusions. For example, the GAO reported:
TSA is also developing a redress procedure where passengers can
attempt to get erroneous data corrected. However, it is unclear
what access passengers will have to information found in either the
governmental or commercial databases, or who is ultimately
responsible for making corrections. Additionally, if errors are
identified during the redress process, TSA does not have the
authority to correct erroneous data in commercial or government
databases. TSA officials said they plan to address this issue by
establishing protocols with commercial data providers and other
federal agencies to assist in the process of getting erroneous data
corrected.99
94. GAO, AVIATION SECURITY, supra note 88, at 3; See also Dept. of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137 (2003).
95. See GAO, AVIATION SECURITY, supra note 88 at 31, Appendix I for a list of the eight
factors that the GAO was asked to evaluate. Many of the factors focused on due process, error
rate, and privacy concerns.
96. Id. at 11-13.
97. Id. at 21-25.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id.
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The GAO also pointed out that CAPPS II might not be effective
in detecting cases of identity theft.100 As CAPPS II was ultimately
cancelled, these shortcomings were never fully addressed.
3. The JetBlue/Torch Concepts Pilot Test
The TSA abandoned CAPPS II in August 2004. Since it was
never fully implemented, there is much speculation as to how such a
program would have worked in practice. There is one pilot test,
however, which gives us a glimpse into potential methodology. In
late 2003, JetBlue Airways confirmed reports that in 2002 it had
provided five million passenger itineraries to a private defense
contractor, Torch Concepts - without passenger consent. 101  The
JetBlue controversy provides a useful window into how commercial
data sets would be used to identify possible terrorist suspects.
As the New York Times reported, Torch Concepts had been hired
by the Army "to determine how information from public and private
records might be analyzed to help defend military bases from attack
by terrorists and other adversaries."' 102 In connection with this study,
Torch Concepts contacted the TSA. And, according to a TSA
spokesperson, the TSA facilitated the transfer of the JetBlue
passenger data to Torch Concepts.
Torch Concepts separately purchased demographic data from
Acxiom, a large data aggregating company. The data related to about
40% of the passengers who held JetBlue itineraries. The
demographic data Acxiom provider for each passenger included:
gender; whether the passenger owned or rented his or her residence:
length of residence; economic status, including income; number of
children; social security number; occupation; and vehicle
information. 103 Torch Concepts matched the itineraries from JetBlue
with the new data from Acxiom, and used the data as part of a study
100. Id. at 30 (noting that TSA officials "acknowledge that some identity theft is difficult to
spot, particularly if the identity theft involves collusion, where someone permits his or her
identity to be assumed by another person, is involved").
101. Anita Ramasastry, Airline Passenger Profiling Based on Private Sector Data: Why It
Raises Serious Privacy Concerns, FINDLAW, Oct. 1, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20031001.html. See also DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.
PRIVACY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PUBLIC ON EVENTS SURROUNDING JETBLUE DATA TRANSFER
(Feb. 2004), http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/jetblue/dhs-report.pdf
102. Philip Shenon, Airline Gave Defense Firm Passenger Files, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2003, at Al. See also Noah Schactman & Ryan Singel, Army Admits Using JetBlue Data,
WIRED, Sept. 23, 2003, http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, I 848,60540,00.html.
103. TORCH CONCEPTS, INC., HOMELAND SECURITY - AIRLINE PASSENGER RISK
ASSESSMENT (2003), http://www.abditum.com/-rabbi/S3B3_Roark.pdf.
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entitled "Homeland Security - Airline Passenger Risk
Assessment." 104 That study was presented in February 2003 at a
conference sponsored by the Tennessee Valley Chapter of the
National Defense Industries Association. The Association then
posted the presentation on its website, where it remained available
until September 16, 2003.
In the study, Torch Concepts concluded that analysis of
passenger demographics indicated distribution within three groupings,
(with most travelers falling into the first two groups): (1) young
middle income home owners with short length-of-residence; (2) older
upper income home owners with longer length-of-residence; and (3)
passengers with "anomalous records."'105 The third category, by
definition, might potentially include renters, students with both home
and school addresses, older persons who have moved recently, and
persons with low incomes. Of course, such persons are in some
senses the norm in America. Yet the program may have deemed them
"anomalous" 
- and thus a risk from a security standpoint.
This should make those in the third group, in particular, nervous.
People may face increased screening simply because they cannot
afford to own their home, because they have recently relocated, or
because, as students, they maintain both home and dorm addresses.
The Torch Concepts study provides concrete example of how data
mining can lead to adverse inferences and consequences for certain
groups of people, not because of any criminal activity, but because
their patterns replicate what has been identified as "suspicious"
behavior.
Finally, there is a possibility that the data transfer may have
violated the federal Privacy Act of 1974. However, while the Act
governs databases that the U.S. government compiles, it does not
regulate how government agencies and their contractors access
private sector databases.
C. Secure Flight
After CAPPS II was scrapped, the TSA introduced another
potential system for passenger screening, known as Secure Flight. 106
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 05-34,
REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER'S EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE SECURE FLIGHT
PROGRAM, at 3-4 (Aug. 2005), available at
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This program was meant to provide an enhanced system for verifying
the identity of passengers, and to see if they matched up against a
number of government terrorist/watch lists. 107 TSA had initially
hoped to launch the program with two airlines in August 2005, but
announced in February 2006 that it had suspended the program due to
security concerns for passenger data. 108 More generally, Secure
Flight was not to be launched until the GAO certified the program,
which it has yet to do.
Secure Flight was meant to include the following four steps,
each of which raises unique problems. 109 First, commercial airlines
would be required to collect additional information from every
passenger in PNRs, including date of birth, and transfer it to the TSA.
Second, the TSA would send the passenger's PNRs (including names,
dates of birth, and whatever other personal information is collected)
to commercial data brokers or aggregators for authentication. These
commercial brokers would report back to the TSA as to whether the
information provided by the passenger matches the information in
their records. Third, the TSA would run the passenger's name
through watch lists maintained by the government's Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC), an entity that is supposed to aggregate the
many dispersed watch lists that the government was maintaining after
9/11. However, this step contains a problem: the evidence indicates
that in the years since 9/1l, these watch lists have not been properly
consolidated or purged of erroneous names. An August 2004 report
by the DHS' own Inspector General found continued problems with
attempts to create a unified watch list. 110 In the final step, law
enforcement must make a decision about how to proceed with a
person identified as a possible risk.
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/aO534/final.pdf [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT 05-34]. See
also Anita Ramasastry, Secure Flight Set to take Off but Will our Data be Secure?, FINDLAW,
July 26, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20050726.html.
107. Id.
108. Associated Press, TSA 's Secure Flight Suspended, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 2, 2006,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/1 1254968.
109. For a useful overview, see GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-05-356,
AVIATION SECURITY, SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING UNDER WAY, BUT RISKS
SHOULD BE MANAGED AS SYSTEM IS FURTHER DEVELOPED 18-20 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05356.pdf [hereinafter GAO, SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT].
110. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-04-31,
DHS CHALLENGES IN CONSOLIDATING TERRORIST WATCH LIST INFORMATION 12-32 (2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG-04-3 1_WatchList.pdf.
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In February 2005, the GAO issued a report on the use of
commercial data in the Secure Flight Process.111 The February GAO
report focused solely on Secure Flight's use of commercial databases
such as Choice Point, and found that the TSA had not developed
successful measures by which to judge the performance of those
commercial databases. Then, in March 2005, the GAO issued a
second report, in response to a October 2004 request from Congress
to evaluate Secure Flight in ten different areas. This second report
was entitled "Initial Secure Flight Test Results Show Improvements
over Current Passenger Prescreening, but Key Issues Regarding How
Data Will Be Obtained and Transmitted Have Not Yet Been
Resolved."11 2
The title says a great deal - and the report says more:
[T]he ability of Secure Flight to make accurate matches between
PNR data and data contained in the terrorist screening database is
dependent on the type and quality of data contained in the database
as well as in PNRs. While TSC and TSA have taken, or plan to
take, a number of actions to improve the quality of the data in the
terrorist screening database, the accuracy of the database has not
been determined. The effectiveness of data matches will also be
dependent on the accuracy of commercial data used to augment the
matching, should TSA decide to use commercial data for Secure
Flight. However, the accuracy of commercial data is
undetermined because there are no industry standards for processes
or requirements to ensure accuracy.11 3
GAO also noted that before Secure Flight goes forward, there
must be a procedure for correcting erroneous data in the hands of data
brokers: the TSA "will need to reach specific agreements with
commercial data aggregators on a process for correcting erroneous
information." 114
The TSA also appointed a body of external experts to constitute
the Secure Flight Working Group (SFWG). This group noted that the
use of commercial data from identity matching, if done appropriately,
could actually help to verify or authenticate passenger identity.
However, in its report to the TSA, the SFWG noted that it had not
received enough information to assess whether: (1) the information
S11. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-05-324, AVIATION SECURITY:
MEASURE FOR TESTING THE IMPACT OF USING DATA FOR SECURE FLIGHT (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05324.pdf [hereinafter GAO, DATA FOR SECURE FLIGHT].
112. GAO, SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 109.
113. Id. at 5 (emphases added).
114. Id.
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that would be provided from the airlines would be sufficient for data
matching, and (2) whether commercial databases have the kind of
data necessary to resolve the challenge of comparing passenger lists
against terrorist watch lists.115 The SFWG also did not receive
information from the TSA indicating which hatching algorithms
worked best. The SFWG, in fact, noted that it saw no evidence that
the TSA had even compared different products and competing
solutions. 116
Even Secure Flight, which is not a predictive system, but a way
to improve accuracy in matching passengers against consolidated
watch lists, was found to be problematic. In essence, it appeared that
the TSA had not made its case as to the accuracy of its program or the
error resolution mechanisms it had proposed to use in the event of a
false positive.
V. IMPROVING GOVERNMENT DATA MINING PRACTICES IN THE
CONTEXT OF TERRORISM PREVENTION
The No-Fly List demonstrates that the use of data mining to
draw inferences can have adverse consequences for Americans. This
is a large reason why the TSA's recent forays into commercial data
mining have been viewed with suspicion. The larger issue remains,
however, about what steps the TSA will take to ensure that any future
programs are properly devised and implemented. Government audits
of CAPPS II, Secure Flight and other data mining initiatives indicate
quite clearly that the TSA and other agencies have not paid sufficient
attention to concerns of individual privacy, error correction and
redress. 117
Data mining, without adequate privacy safeguards, has the
potential to be used as a tool to spy on American citizens without the
judicial or procedural constraints that limit traditional surveillance
techniques. To the extent that future government initiatives will link
commercial databases to terrorism prevention, it is incumbent upon
policymakers to rethink the issue on a larger scale. Rather than
examining individual programs, it is time to envision what sort of
privacy rules and practices should be used by both partners in the
115. REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, supra note 56, at 11-12.
116. Id. at 6.
117. MARKLE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that government data
mining efforts "continue to provoke controversy because of the lack of systematic effort to
consider the privacy implications of the proposed programs or to develop an overall policy
framework that would govern the deployment of new technologies").
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system - the commercial entities acting as agents of the state, and
the government, which is purchasing commercial data for law
enforcement purposes.
As Christopher Hoofnagle has pointed out, there is currently
ambiguity as to whether the federal Privacy Act of 1974 applies to
commercial data brokers who supply information to the government.
The Privacy Act embodies so-called fair information practices, and
requires the government to apply these practices to records that it
maintains which contain personal information. It also prohibits the
government from collecting personal information unless it has a
"proper purpose" for doing so. 1 18
If the government does collect data, such collection is subject to
a series of rights: the federal government must give notice to the
public of all of the databases it maintains; it must allow people to
access and correct their data; and the data collecting must be limited
only to information necessary to fulfill a specific government
function. The Privacy Act, however, applies only to the federal
government and companies administering a system of records for the
government. At present, it is not clear whether a database which
originates in the private sector, and is then used by the government, is
subject to the Act. In fact, "credit-reporting agencies are specifically
exempted from being considered a federal contractor for systems of
records." 119 Thus, one important legislative fix would be to require
that data brokers who supply information to the government for data
mining be subject to the Privacy Act when serving a government
function. Unless this is clarified, if the data is maintained in the
private sector and only "accessed" by the government, it is unclear
what types of access and error correction will be required of data
brokers.
The Markle Foundation convened a Task Force on National
Security in the Information Age, which examined the issue of
government access to private sector data and attempted to come up
with rules to help government decide when it is appropriate to
examine commercial data, and how such data should be handled. One
recommendation was that if a false positive imposes significant
consequences on a person, the requirement for data accuracy needs to
118. Hoofiagle, supra note 26, at 622-23. See also JAMES DEMPSEY, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY'S GAP: THE LARGELY NON-EXISTENT LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT MINING OF COMMERCIAL DATA (2003),
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030528cdt.pdf.
119. Hoofnagle, supra note 26, at 623.
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be stringent.120 The Markle Task Force noted, for example, that "we
believe that the government should not have routine access to
personally identifiable information even if that information is widely
available to the public.' 121 A higher bar of relevance to a legitimate
purpose applies to government acquisition, and that bar should be
even higher with greater degrees of sensitivity. The Task Force
proposes a three-tier standard for data classification and acquisition
- low, medium and high. This is a useful first step.
But perhaps the best way to begin to imagine how we can
safeguard privacy in the wake of data mining is to require the
government to provide robust data-mining privacy impact
assessments. To date, the TSA and other federal agencies have not
provided transparent and meaningful assessments of existing or
proposed data mining initiatives. 122 What should a privacy impact
assessment for a data-mining program (whether it is CAPPS II or
Secure Flight) look like? It should begin with the basics -
information that, surprisingly, the government has been unwilling to
disclose in the context of TIA and CAPPS.
First, information about the databases themselves should be
provided. What kind of data will be compiled, and, from what
sources? How will the data be merged? Will it include information
individuals tend to consider highly private, such as medical data, data
on children, and financial data? Second, information about access to
the data and databases should be provided. With whom can the data
be shared, and upon what showing, if any? Which authorities, in
particular, will have access? Can only federal authorities access the
data, or can state authorities access it as well? What about foreign
governments who are U.S. allies? What about private companies
involved in defense or security as government contractors, or private
domestic and foreign airline companies? Third, how will limits on
data sharing be enforced? What are the legal and technological
guarantees that those in the private sector, or those in the government
who lack authorization, will not be able to access the data and
databases? How can hackers be prevented from accessing the data?
120. MARKLE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 60.
121. Idat 33.
122. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT. No. GAO-05-866, DATA MINING: AGENCIES
HAVE TAKEN KEY STEPS TO PROTECT PRIVACY IN SELECTED EFFORTS, BUT SIGNIFICANT
COMPLIANCE ISSUES REMAIN 33 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05866.pdf. See also
Aliya Stemstein, GAO: Federal Data Mining not Obeying Federal Privacy Rules, FED.
COMPUTER WEEK, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.fcw.com/article90517-08-29-05-Web.
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After these basics are out of the way, a cost-benefit analysis must
begin. For instance, is it truly worthwhile to pay the privacy cost of
including very sensitive information, such as medical data, or to allow
wide access to the databases? Or is the benefit of including these
types of information modest enough that its collection should be
eliminated or curtailed? The chance of catching a terrorist due to the
inclusion of individuals' medical histories may be slight, and not
worth the privacy cost. Similarly, the chance of catching terrorists as
a result of allowing local government officials to access the databases
may be slight, and not worth the risk that employees may try to check
up on their neighbors.
A cost-benefit analysis ought also to be made with respect to
particular technologies. A search system may be advantageous in
certain ways, but may also turn up a large number of false positives.
Are the false positives - and resulting wrongful accusations - too
great a cost? Perhaps a different system, one that is more accurate but
casts a narrower net, is preferable. Once these decisions about the
nature of the searching system, the databases, and the data are made,
they must be made public. If there are procedures for protecting
privacy, they should be made public so that people will know if they
have been victimized by a violation.
If the government uses data compiled in the private sector, such
data may very well contain errors. The government must consider
how errors in its databases - errors that may prevent innocent
persons from flying, or have other consequences - will be corrected.
A related question is how often the databases will be updated and
revised. Procedures for error correction are needed and should be
well publicized, so that no one is forced to live with a mistake in his
or her data that limits the freedom to travel - or any other freedoms.
If a citizen is falsely identified as a risk, he or she needs to be able to
clear his or her name from any security or watch lists, for example.
Finally, any data-mining program needs to have a redress
mechanism. Arguably, Americans must not only be able to correct
database errors, but also, if they are harmed by privacy violations,
they must be able to take specific legal recourse against the
government. First, passengers should know why they are on the lists.
For instance, they should know what person or organization reported
them - unless that interferes with national security. Some
passengers on the No-Fly/Selectee lists have expressed concern that
they may have been singled out because of their ethnicity, religion, or
political activity. Second, there should be a fair, uniform process to
796 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
be used by passengers who seek to get off the lists. The failures of
the TSA ombudsman are obvious, and must be corrected.
Everyone must be told, through notices posted at airports, how to
contact the relevant decision maker and what the procedures are for
attempting to get removed from the list. There need to be standards
set for removal. And everyone who complains must get a response -
a reasoned response. In deciding what the response should be, the
decision maker must adhere to rules, treating like cases alike. The
decision maker must give would-be passengers as much information
as possible, consistent with national security, as to how they were
placed on the lists. Negative decisions should be subject to appeal.
Finally, when a person is cleared, he or she ought to be taken off the
list - not just given a letter to show to airlines and airport security.
The lack of due process provides a gap in which discrimination
and other abuses can become exacerbated. Blacklisting has drastic
consequences for people, and can cause lasting harm to a person. Yet
until the government watch-lists comply with due process, blacklists
are what they will be.
VI. CONCLUSION
The "No-Fly" list provides a telling example of the problems
created by incorrect inferences. This does not mean that government
use of data mining should be prohibited. In fact, a government's
effort to tap into commercial databases was meant to make identity
verification more robust and ultimately more reliable. In other words,
in a best-case scenario, governmental data mining could identify and
distinguish, from among a group of persons who share a common
name, one who truly poses a security risk from one who does not.
What is currently missing from the equation is effective debate
and discussion on how to make data mining processes more protective
of individual privacy, and how to safeguard the rights of individuals
who are wrongly targeted for adverse government action as a result of
adverse inferences. The public needs to understand how data is being
translated from the private sector into the public sector, and what sort
of interpretations are being made by government decision makers
with that data.
